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Abstract. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auction was a 
new kind of auction used for the allocation of licences for the use and 
exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in The United States. This 
auction set a methodological standard of design and engineering in 
economics; its design adopted some properties from the traditional 
English and Dutch auctions and it also add new innovative properties, 
such as multiple rounds where bidders can return unwanted items. Unlike 
the English and the Dutch auctions, the FCC auction was designed and 
built by social scientists. The large revenue it raised was hailed as a proof 
of success of mechanism design theory. This success led some European 
governments to hire mechanism designers for the design and 
implementation of similar auctions for the allocation of licences on the 
electromagnetic spectrum.  The success was not only due to the knowledge 
available from mechanism design theory but also from the practical 
knowledge experimental economists have, they performed the 
experiments testing the rules and mechanisms, which produced data 
crucial for the design and the implementation of the new auction. In this 
article, I present a methodological account of the FCC auction design 
discussing two main components of it, namely the blueprint produced by 
mechanism designers and the experiments performed for producing the 
data missing in the blueprint. I also evaluate this blueprint using the types 
of design and principles, namely minimal analogy and type-hierarchies.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCCION  
I characterise the method used by experimental economists designing the FCC 
auction as the method of experimental parameter variation, which I take from 
aeronautical engineering. The introduction of the method of experimental 
parameter variation allows philosophers to pay attention to practical knowledge, 
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or knowledge of practices, as opposed to propositional knowledge. Practical 
knowledge has been largely ignored in epistemology and in the philosophy of 
science. Science is not only the knowledge of theories, laws and inferences; there 
is a vast array of practices, some of them highly successful and sophisticated. 
Engineering and experimental methods have been mostly developed in the 
natural sciences, where they have been growing in size and sophistication. In 
economics and other social sciences these methods have been developed only 
recently, and there seems to be an increasing demand for more experimental and 
engineering knowledge in these sciences.   
The FCC auction blueprint is a multipleround simultaneous ascending 
auction. This blueprint was produced by three mechanism design theorists, Paul 
Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston McAfee.  I characterise this blueprint as 
partly dirigiste and oligopolistic, and explain why on four of the five principles 
of design advanced by the philosopher Nancy Cartwright, this blueprint falls 
below the standard by leaving some gaps in the design. Using the rules on 
minimal and maximal analogy and type-hierarchies, I argue that this blueprint is 
a case of minimal analogy, and therefore it is a progressive design within the 
type-hierarchy of auctions.   
In section 2, I introduce and describe the method of experimental parameter 
variation from aeronautical engineering. For this, I rely on the work from Walter 
Vincenti, an engineer who illustrates this method using the experimental work 
the mechanical engineers William F. Durand and Everett P. Lesley did in the 
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1920s, when they tested a large number of new air propeller prototypes using a 
wind tunnel. The data obtained were crucial for the manufacturing of propellers 
ready to be assembled in a new model of aircrafts superior to those available at 
the time.    
In section 3., I show how the method of experimental parameter variation 
can be extended to experimental economics, and in particular to the experiments 
performed by Charles Plott and his team searching for data crucial for the 
successful implementation of the FCC auction. The experimental work done by 
Plott and the data obtained filled the gap left in the blueprint submitted by Paul 
Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston McAfee.   
  
2. THE FCC BLUEPRINT  
Multiple-round simultaneous auctions are a new kind of auction designed and 
implemented by the mechanism design theorists and experimental economists. 
The creation of this new kind of auction came as a product of a call made by the 
US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1993 for a new more 
efficient mechanism to be used for the allocation of licences to 
telecommunication firms for the use and exploitation of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.   
A multiple-round simultaneous auction is a social machine consisting of 
three main mechanisms, namely a simultaneous market, ascending biding and 
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multiple rounds. In a multiple-round simultaneous auction, several markets are 
open at the same time, so any bidder can place any number of bids in different 
markets.  The markets run in rounds and remain open until the bidders have 
accomplished the best purchase by selling back some items and buying new ones. 
These properties of the auction allow a highly efficient allocation of licences and 
the maximisation of revenue for the auctioneer, which in this case was a 
government institution. The design of this new auction relied on the pioneering 
work of the economist William Vickrey, who designed an auction of multiple 
items with a sealed bid, where the auctioneer is also a government agency just 
like the case of the FCC where multiples licences are auctioned. With this design, 
Vickrey was trying to solve the problem of imperfect competition in free markets, 
which can lead to undersupply and oversupply of commodities. An auction of 
multiple items with a sealed bid provides the blueprint of a social machine, whose 
mechanisms could attain competitive equilibrium prices of commodities.   
The design and successful implementation of the first multiple-round 
simultaneous was hailed as an outstanding achievement almost exclusively due 
to game theory, which clouded the important and distinctive engineering work 
done by experimental economics. The philosopher Francesco Guala made a 
significant advancement showing the crucial contribution made by experimental 
economists; he presents the case mainly as a problem of logic, where inferences 
made in the laboratory have to be extended to the outside world.1  Unlike Guala, 
                                                          
1 F. Guala (2005), pp. 178-181, 194-199.    
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I present the case as a methodological problem concerned with design and 
blueprint-making methods.  In particular, I argue that the method of experimental 
parameter variation was used by experimental economists in order to produce 
data essential for the design and implementation of the FCC auction.   
As part of the decentralising trend of public assets and services in 1980s, 
the US Congress decided to look for a new and more efficient mechanism for the 
allocation of licences for the use and exploitation of the airwave space, which 
would lead to the provision of mobile communication with cellular telephones 
and radio systems, and the transmission of data with fax machines. Until 1982 
these licences were allocated using an administrative hearing process known as 
the ‘beauty contest’, in which each applicant had to persuade the FCC of the 
benefits of adjudicating a licence to them. This allocation procedure was slow, 
opaque and highly bureaucratic. A first attempt at replacing the beauty contest 
was made by introducing a lottery where licences were randomly allocated to the 
applicants.  This new mechanism was fast, transparent and simpler; however it 
created strong inefficiencies by allocating licences to applicants who have no real 
interest in exploiting the licence. This created a secondary market where licences 
were sold and resold creating large profits for private individuals, and a loss in 
revenue for the government.    
The US Congress was aware of the disastrous experience in New Zealand 
and Australia in the early 1990s, where licences were allocated using first-price 
and second-price sealed-bid auctions. These auctions were chosen without asking 
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for scientific advice; they produced large losses in the government’s revenue, and 
they also prompted strong criticism from the public and rival political parties.2 
The US government looked for scientific advice issuing in 1993 a ‘Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making’, where the FCC advanced an initial design of an auction 
in two stages, expecting replies and comments mainly from economists and game 
theorists. In order to prevent an oligopolistic distribution and promote economic 
equality, the original policy set by the Congress considered a distribution of 
licences to minority-owned and women-owned companies, small businesses, and 
rural telephone companies. However, the final design excluded these groups by 
allocating the licences to those bidders holding the highest bids, which led to an 
oligopolistic distribution with an increase of inequality.   
 Game theorists model auctions as non-cooperative games played by self-
interested utility-maximising bidders. This game assumes a solution under Nash 
equilibrium, namely that given everyone’s moves, no player can be better off 
than she currently is by shifting to a different strategy. There were two important 
problems mechanism design theorists faced in designing the new FCC auction. 
The first one was related to the complementary character of licences in 
contiguous regions of the spectrum. The second one was related to the existence 
of perfect substitutes in different portions of spectrum. Given these two 
properties, the value of any package of licences would vary according to number 
and combination of contiguous and non-contiguous portions of the spectrum. 
                                                          
2 See J. McMillan (1994).    
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Moreover, a number of further conditions such as affordable technologies and 
operation costs had to be considered in the design. These further conditions added 
to the perfect substitution and complementary values produced an excessively 
large number of packages with almost each of them having a different value.   
Generally, auction models assume a common value of the items, that is to 
say, the value of the auctioned item is assumed to be the same for every bidder 
but unknown to all.  The design of auctions where items have different values for 
different bidders was in an early stage. The economic theory available at the time 
did not provide the means for estimating the different outcomes of an auction 
where the items have different values. Some insights pointed to the highly 
problematic nature of items with complementary properties, whose unstable 
value produces different Nash equilibria with no clear indication as to which of 
them is optimal. Therefore, the design of the FCC auction represented an 
important challenge due to the lack of data on important aspects which no theory 
could provide. The situation is the same to that of the design of the new air 
propellers to be discussed in the next section, where data which the  
blade element theory could not supply were lacking.   
The FCC hired the economist John McMillan, who suggested an auction 
in two stages. In the first stage, the licences would be auctioned in packages using 
a sealed bid, and in the second stage only individual licences would be auctioned. 
This mechanism seemed to solve the complementarity problem since those 
bidders who value packages over individual licences would place high bids in 
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order to get more than one licence. In the second stage, bidders with a preference 
for individual licences would equally place high bids. In both cases, an auction 
with two stages seemed to be efficient by allocating licences to bidders who could 
maximise their use and exploitation based on their willingness to pay more for 
them. This design was supported by the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), a public institution advising the government 
and the FCC, which had also suggested package-bidding after getting the advice 
from the economist John Ledyard, who had worked on the design of 
combinatorial auctions.3 Unlike the beauty contest and the lottery, this design 
was scientifically supported. Because this design was fully controlled by FCC 
and the NTIA, and because these two government agencies decide the 
combination of licences in each package, the design is dirigiste, that is to say, it 
contains some properties of central planning.     
Some telecommunication firms were critical of package-bidding as it was 
not competitive enough because for it prevented some bidders from purchasing 
some licences, which created an unfair advantage for those who may be allocated 
with a large part of the spectrum; they thought that an open bid could provide 
equal bidding opportunities to all. Telecommunication firms realised that a bad 
design could actually affect their own interests by creating unfair and inefficient 
allocation, and so they decided to hire their own scientific advisors. The 
economists Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Charles Plott were hired by Pacific 
                                                          
3 See J. Ledyard et. al. (1997).   
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Bell; Jeremy Bulow and Barry Nalebuff by Bell Atlantic; Preston McAfee by 
Airtouch Communications, Robert Weber by Telephone and Data Systems; Mark 
Isaac by the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association; Robert Harris 
and Michael Katz by Nynex, Daniel Vincent by American Personal 
Communications, Peter Cramton by MCI; and John Ledyard and David Porter by 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration.4  
Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson put forward a new design which they 
called ‘simultaneous ascending-bid auction’. Separately, Preston McAfee put 
forward a similar design. A simultaneous open auction constituted the answer to 
the concerns voiced by private firms on package-bidding with a sealed bid, and 
it also represented an improvement on the two stages considered in the FCC 
initial design.   
In a simultaneous open auction several markets are open at the same time 
and bidders can participate in all of them at once. This was a true innovation in 
auction design. Unlike a sealed bid, an open simultaneous auction allows each 
bidder to monitor the behaviour of other bidders. This valuable information 
enables her to assess her chances of buying the combination of items she prefers. 
During the auction, bidders can move freely from one combination to another by 
selling back to the market those items over which their preference has changed, 
until they accomplish a combination with the highest value. Another important 
advantage of this new design over a sealed bid is that it helps prevent the winner’s 
                                                          
4 See J. McMillan (1994); F. Guala (2005), pp. 167-168.   
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curse, that is to say, the possibility of overbidding. This can be prevented because 
bidders can monitor the pricing behaviour of others.   
 Besides the open character of the new auction, simultaneous bidding on 
several markets all opened at the same time was also another important 
innovation. In the traditional English ascending auction, items are auctioned one 
by one starting with a low price, and bidders continue making offers until the 
market is closed, which usually occurs when no new offer is put forward. 
Therefore, the possibility of getting a combination of items is not directly made 
available. This could only occur if a second market is open where items are resold 
but not all items may be there, and prices would also increase because of the costs 
and time involved in opening a second market.   
In the traditional Dutch descending auction time is fixed and items are sold 
in packages starting with a high price, which prevents other bidders from 
purchasing individual items they have a strong preference for. Again, a secondary 
resale market could be open but the same problems of time and cost rising would 
appear. Therefore, a direct sale in one single market represents a more efficient 
design. Because in the Dutch auction prices start high and time is limited, demand 
may be prematurely terminated affecting prices and efficiency in the allocation 
of items. A simultaneous ascending auction prevents this situation by allowing 
more time holding a long round until no new bid is put forward. It also prevents 
a resale in expensive secondary market by providing different rounds, where 
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bidders can sell back to the market any number of items as well as buy new ones 
until they are satisfied with a package.  
The final blueprint was prepared and submitted by Paul Milgrom, Robert 
Wilson and Preston McAfee. It contained the descriptions of the three new 
mechanisms, namely a simultaneous market, ascending biding and multiple 
rounds. This blueprint can be evaluated using the types of design discussed in 
chapter two, namely libertarian and dirigiste, and the five principles of design 
and engineering advanced by Nancy Cartwright. Also, a further evaluation can 
be made using the distinction between minimal and maximal analogy, and by 
constructing a type-hierarchy.  
Because the electromagnetic spectrum is controlled and fully regulated by 
the state through the FCC and the NTIA,5 and because these two agencies still 
controlled part of the design, this blueprint retained some aspects of central 
planning. The blueprint is oligopolistic because by allocating the licences to those 
holding the highest bids, it excludes minority-owned, women-owned companies, 
small businesses and rural telephone companies, so such a design fosters the 
domination of the market by a small number of firms.   
The contrast between the traditional English and Dutch auctions and the 
new FCC auction with multiple-rounds, simultaneous markets and ascending 
                                                          
5 The design of FCC auction was made under the USA Communications Act of 1934, which defined the 
electromagnetic spectrum as publicly-owned resource and prohibited any private ownership of it; those 
granted with a licence were defines as ‘public trustees’. The law rapidly changed in 1996 after the first FCC 
auctions were run extending the rights of the licence holders, who could now hold the licence almost 
permanently; see K. Corbett (1996) for details.   
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bidding provides a further case and illustration of the distinction between 
traditional and artefactual institutions. The contrast between traditional and 
artefactual institutions can be made between the International Gold Standard, and 
the International Monetary Fund. Like the Gold Standard and other cases of 
commodity money, the Dutch and the English auctions were also created without 
the help from scientists, that is, without using mechanism design theory and 
neoclassical economics. In contrast, the FCC auction is the product of scientific 
design, it is a social machine made up of three main mechanisms assembled to 
create a whole new machine. Friedrich Hayek (1943, 1978) argued against the 
creation of an international monetary institution endowed with the power to 
dictate national economic policies and produce fiat money, as it had been 
suggested in the blueprint put forward by John Maynard Keynes (1923, 1943). 
This was only a case of a general argument Hayek made against design and 
engineering, which he described as ‘constructivist’, and against dirigisme,  that 
is, against central planning and control.   
The first design of the auction in two stages where the FCC and the NTIA 
decided on the combination of licences in each package was a case of dirigisme 
with central planning. Such dirigisme was prevented by the action from 
telecommunications firms who hired scientists to produce designs where their 
own interest were fostered and protected. Therefore, the final blueprint became 
partly libertarian by giving those firms the power to decide how to form their 
own licence packages. A full right-libertarian blueprint would have considered 
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giving private firms the control and ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum 
instead of just giving them a licence. This would have led to the extinction of the 
FCC and the NTIA or the reduction of them to agencies supervising the quality 
standards of the telecommunication services. In contrast, a blueprint which 
includes licences for minority-owned, women-owned companies, small 
businesses, and rural telephone companies as it was originally planned would 
have been at least partly egalitarian, although still dirigiste.   
A sharper contrast can be made with the blueprints from left-libertarianism 
and a property-owing democracy, where direct widespread ownership of the 
electromagnetic spectrum among the unemployed, low-income families and 
other worst-off groups could be considered. In this case, without having to wait 
for the distribution of the revenue raised by the FCC auction and taxes through 
welfare institutions under the blueprint submitted by Milgrom, Wilson and 
McAfee. Additionally, the size of the welfare state would be reduced and also 
the power and size of central government, which in this case is represented by 
the FCC and the NTIA. The contrast with left-libertarianism and a property-
owing democracy can only be generic because blueprints from these positions 
are virtually inexistent.6 Mechanism design theory and experimental economics 
are dominated by neoclassical economics and welfare economics. I argue for a 
methodology of design and engineering in the social sciences, which can be 
                                                          
6 For recent views on left-libertarianism see P. Vallentyne and H. Steiner (ed.) (2000).  John Rawls (1999, 
pp. xiv-xv, 242-251; 2001, pp.135-140) argues for a property-owing democracy.   
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detached from their current ideological and historical biases, and can therefore 
be made available to other positions; particularly those where design and 
engineering are poor or inexistent.   
A second evaluation can be made by using the rules on minimal and 
maximal analogy and type-hierarchies. The magnetic force models from James 
Maxwell and William were presented as examples of maximal and minimal 
analogies. The model from Thompson was more progressive because by 
describing the magnetic force as a field it minimised the analogy with the 
mechanical Newtonian paradigm, while the model from Maxwell maximised 
such an analogy. This analogy was further appreciated by building a type-
hierarchy. In a similar way, minimal and maximal analogies can be applied to 
blueprints also building a type-hierarchy.  
Eileen Way (see Harré 1995) defines a type as ‘a set of individuals each of 
which has certain properties which are numerically identical with those in other 
sets of higher type’. Because types have a nominal status, the relationship they 
hold with their tokens cannot be that of ‘qualitative identity’, which only holds 
‘between the relevant concrete properties of each particular’7; numerical identity 
does the job of establishing the relationship needed between tokens and the types. 
For instance, a ‘gold coin’ is a token whose properties are numerically related to 
those contained in the ‘commodity money’, which is a nominal representation. 
Types are ordered according to their level of generality forming a pyramid or a 
                                                          
7 R. Harré, J. L. Aronson, E. C. Way (1995), pp. 15-16.   
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three-like classification. Because commodity money is a traditional kind of 
money distinct from fiat money, is it necessary to distinguish between traditional 
social kinds and artefactual social kinds. Traditional kinds rely on custom and 
knowledge accumulated across different generations without the intervention of 
science, while artefactual kinds are a product of science, design and engineering. 
The same distinction can be applied in the natural sciences, for instance in 
chemistry where natural and synthetic elements are distinguished, or in synthetic 
biology where a distinction is made between natural and synthetic DNA.   
Tyype-hierarchies can be graphically presented using a tree-like shape 
placing at the top  the type with the largest extension, which is called a supertype. 
The same graphic presentation can be made for the multiple-round simultaneous 
auction placing ‘institution’ as the supertype, and also by distinguishing 
traditional from artefactual auctions:8 See figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Different criteria can be used for classifying auctions and there are further types of them, see P. 
Klemperer (2004), and P. Milgrom (2004).    
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Figure 1. A partial type-hierarchy of multiple-round simultaneous auction:  
  
                                                        Institution  
 
Japanese      English      Dutch               Multiple-round simultaneous      
Second-price sealed-bid 
     
                                                                    
Although, there is no paradigm shift in the design of the multiple-round 
simultaneous auction, significant progress was made in the design of artefactual 
auctions, which started with the work of William Vickrey (1961), who designed 
the second-price sealed-bid auction. The multiple-round simultaneous auction is 
an artefactual auction which combines aspects of the English and the Dutch 
auctions, namely ascending bidding and the combination of items in packages, 
adding to them multiple rounds, the return of any unwanted licences, and bid 
increments decided by the auctioneer. The similarities with the English and the 
Dutch auction constitute the positive analogy, and multiple rounds, the return of 
                                          State           Market  
         Political   Economic   Social          Barter          With a medium of exchange        
          
                               
                                                                           Auction                  Sale  
                                                             
                                                          Traditional                       Artefactual  
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unwanted licences and bid increments constitute the negative analogy. Because 
the size of the negative analogy is larger, the blueprint is a case of minimal 
analogy, and therefore it is a progressive design within the type-hierarchy. 
Design by analogy does not exist as part of the methods in mechanism design 
theory, it is a topic to be developed both in philosophy and the social sciences.     
A third evaluation of the Milgrom-Wilson-McAfee blueprint can be made 
using the five principles for blueprint making from Nancy Cartwright, (2007) 
namely:  
(i) The parts that make up the machine, their properties and the separate 
capacities.  
(ii) How the parts are to be assembled. 
(iii) The rules for calculating the outcome from the joint operation of the 
assembled parts. 
(iv) What counts as shielding.  
(v) How the machine is set to run.     
 
Cartwright used the blueprint of a repudiation-proof contract from Oliver Hart 
and John Moore (1994) to illustrate how these principles work and how their 
demands should be met. With the help of equilibrium theory and the rules for 
renegotiation designed by Hart and Moore an optimal equilibrium can be 
accomplished by decisions made by the players, which solves the inefficiency 
created when the contract is repudiated.  Hart and Moore’s blueprint only meets 
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the requirements from the first three principles because it describes the parts of 
the machine, namely two individual players the investor and the entrepreneur 
both displaying specific psychological capacities: self-interest, greed, perfect and 
costless calculation, and full rationality. Other parts are structural or external to 
both players such as the same discount rates, certainty in all operations, rules for 
renegotiation, and the existence of a frictionless second-hand market for the 
physical assets of the project. The structural parts and the players are assembled 
in a single game with two stages, one with an initial negotiation and agreement 
on a certain distribution of the surplus, and a second one when repudiation of the 
contract occurs and the surplus is now divided in equal parts.  However, the 
blueprint does not provide information on how to shield the new contract and 
how to implement it.   
The evaluation of the multiple-round simultaneous auction blueprint is less 
positive. The parts of the machine were known, namely self-interested 
telecommunications firms with high purchasing power and the FCC as a greedy 
government agency wanting to maximise the revenue. The structural parts were 
also known, which consisted of rules defining the three main mechanisms, 
namely a simultaneous market, ascending biding and multiple rounds. Although, 
Milgrom, Wilson, McAfee and others were confident that the auction would 
work, there was no knowledge on how to put all the different parts together and 
how to set the whole auction running; and there were no means either for getting 
a reliable calculation on the outcome. There were concerns about collusion 
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among the bidders and attempts from them to outwit the rules, however no 
precise shielding against these possibilities was part of the blueprint. McAfee and 
Milgrom actually explain that ‘the spectrum sale is more complicated than 
anything in auction theory. No theorem exists–or can be expected to develop–
that specifies the optimal auction form.’9  
Two of the main problems were complementarity and perfect substitution 
of the licences, and a solution using Nash equilibrium was not feasible. For 
instance, because licences packages would be formed, the existence of 
complementary values means ‘that market-clearing prices may not exist. 
Equilibrium is likely to exist if the buyers have similar views about how the 
goods should be aggregated, whereas it may not if they disagree about what 
constitutes good aggregations.’252 The solution to this and other problems was 
provided by the experimental economist Charles Plott and his team, who devised 
the experiments which produced the data needed using the method of 
experimental parameter variation. Milgrom himself recognises this when he 
writes that ‘much of what is known about multi-unit auctions with 
interdependencies comes from experiments.’10   
 
                                                          
9 P. McAfee and J. Milgrom (1996), p. 171.   
252 Ibid., p. 172.   
10 J. McMillan (1994), p. 151.   
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3. EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETER VARIATION 
The engineer Walter G. Vincenti has produced a methodological account of 
aeronauticalengineering, where he surveys different historical episodes of 
engineering research and design to illustrate a number of methodological 
practices. One of the most suggestive methodological practices he identifies in 
this survey is Experimental Parameter Variation (EPV), which he defines as: ‘the 
procedure of repeatedly determining the performance of some material, process, 
or device while systematically varying the parameters that define the object of 
interest or its conditions of operation.’11 He explains that this method is 
distinctive of engineering in contrast to scientific theories:   
  
Experimental parameter variation is used in engineering (and only in 
engineering) to produce the data needed to bypass the absence of a useful 
quantitative theory, that is, to get on with the engineering job when no 
accurate or convenient theoretical knowledge is available. This is perhaps 
the most important statement about the role of parameter variation in 
engineering.12  
  
Vincenti illustrates this method by discussing the work from the mechanical 
engineers William F. Durand and Everett P. Lesley, who performed extensive 
experimental research between 1916 and 1926 with the purpose of designing and 
                                                          
11 W. Vincenti (1990), p. 139.   
12 Ibid., pp. 161-162.   
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producing new fixed-pitch air propellers superior to those available in Europe. 
Prior to the development of variable-pitch propellers in the 1930s, only fixed-
pitch propellers were used in aircrafts. Since the shape of a fixed-pitch propeller 
could not be changed during different flight conditions, they were optimised for 
cruise, climb or take-off depending on which one was most critical for the 
airplane mission. Choices were also made selecting a propeller which could 
attain a compromise general performance, where no aspect was optimised.   
In the United States no significant research had been done since the 
pioneering achievements of the Wright brothers in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Although, some information on air propellers was available at 
the time, no systematic data existed which could support a new design. Only a 
few results were available from the experimental work done by Gustave Eiffel, a 
French engineer who had developed a new type of wind tunnel for experimenting 
with three families of different propellers, with each family containing four types 
of propellers. Experimental engineering research work on air propellers began in 
England, France and Germany around 1910. By 1913 in England comparisons 
were made between previous theoretical work and experimental data showing 
that theory was only useful for the general qualitative aspects of design. 
Accordingly, the quantitative part would have to be developed from data to be 
obtained in the laboratory.    
In contrast, the amount of systematic data on marine propellers was 
significantly larger. By 1905 William Durand had produced experimental results 
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on forty-nine different prototypes using the method of experimental parameter 
variation. By 1908 in England, Robert Froude had reported results on thirty-six 
marine propellers. In the United Stated this was followed by a hundred-and-
twenty more results reported by David Taylor in 1910. Because of the availability 
of data on marine propellers, Durand and Lesley relied on them for their research 
on air propellers.   
In addition to the existing experimental data on marine propellers, the blade 
element theory from Stefan Drzewiecki was also available. This theory divides 
the blade of a propeller into a large number elements at different radii, and each 
element is modelled as a small aerofoil moving in a straight line with a velocity 
determined by three components, namely the forward speed of the propeller, the 
tangential speed of the rotating element, and a secondary speed of flow induced 
by the aerodynamic action of the propeller itself. Then, the forces of each element 
at its appropriate velocity are estimated from experimental aerofoil data. Finally, 
the performance of the propeller is determined by summing all those forces.   
One of the main problems Durand and Lesley faced was the calculation of 
the secondary flow induced by the action of the propeller. They used the blade 
element theory neglecting this secondary force and other complicating effects. 
By doing this they were able to calculate the performance of eighty two-blade air 
propellers by varying the parameters in a theoretical fashion. They compared 
these results to those obtained through experimentation finding that the general 
trend was same, while the quantitative values were substantially different and 
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erratic.13 This discrepancy between theory and experiment is very important 
because it shows the limits of theoretical knowledge for purposes of design. 
Theoretical knowledge is frequently insufficient for design; no reliable and 
efficient design can exclusively rely on it.  The theoretical calculus of trends in 
the performance of air propellers made by Durand and Lesley is analogous to 
calculus of behavioural tendencies made by experimental economists, who also 
produced experimental data for design which a theory cannot provide. This is 
shown in the next section with the design of the multiple-round simultaneous 
auction.   
Durand and Lesley produce new data by testing different prototypes of 
propellers made of different materials and with different shapes by systematically 
varying the parameters within the range of practical concern, defined mainly by 
a set of foreseeable flight requirements and conditions. They define the 
performance of a fixed-pitch air propeller as the function of two different sets of 
parameters, namely the conditions of operation and the geometrical properties of 
the propeller. The former includes the forward speed V and the revolutions per 
unit time n; the latter includes the diameter D and a number of ratios r1, r2, … 
etc. which contain information on the geometrical shape. The propeller 
performance P is determined by the following equation: P = F(V, n, D, r1 , r2,…). 
The description in the equation is approximate because it leaves out complicated 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p. 155.  
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secondary effects from viscosity, compressibility of the air and the elastic 
bending of the propeller. Given the aim of the design, these effects can be 
neglected. Once the value range of concern has been fixed and the list of 
particular values has been established, ‘parameter variation for the propeller 
consists of systematically varying the values of the parameters within the 
parentheses and measuring the resulting variation of propeller performance.’14  
Because of the crucial role of the geometrical shape of the propeller, the 
ratios became the relevant parameters to be tested. After some preliminary tests, 
Durand and Lesley selected a diameter of three feet for all the small-scale 
prototypes and they established five parameters of relevance defined by ratios r1 
to r5. The most important parameter was the mean pitch ratio, which is a measure 
of the angular orientation at some standard representative radius relative to the 
plane of propeller rotation of the blade section. This parameter is particularly 
important because the larger the mean pitch ratio, the higher is the angular 
orientation of all blade sections. The other four parameters contained information 
on the distribution of the pitch ratio along the blade and the type of blade section. 
They chose three equally spaced values of mean pitch ratio and two values of 
each of the other four parameters. Using all possible combinations of values, 
Durand and Lesley obtained forty-eight different propeller models, which were 
distributed in a representative way over the field of design. Using a wind tunnel, 
                                                          
14 Ibid., p. 148.   
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each model was tested using a prototype through a series of values of rotational 
speed n at distinct values of forward speed V to determine its performance P. 
Those with the highest value were selected.   
This was the initial and fundamental stage of the research, where the 
method of experimental parameter variation was crucial for obtaining data 
needed in further stages until the completion of the full design, construction and 
final test of the new propellers. The research continued until Durand and Lesley 
built and tested a full-scale prototype. Vincenti explains how they used laws of 
similitude and dimensional analysis to proceed from the data obtained on the 
forty-eight small-scale prototypes to the construction and testing of small-scale 
models and fullscale prototypes.15 Once the full-scale prototypes successfully 
passed all necessary tests, the engineering research phase was followed by the 
manufacturing of propellers ready to be assembled into the aircrafts. Propellers 
only work in combination with the right engine and airframe, so new airplanes 
were designed with engines and airframes adequate to the selected propeller. In 
this way, the vast amount data provided by Durand and Lesley using 
experimental parameter variation became crucial for the design of new superior 
aircrafts, which had been the ultimate aim of the research.   
         Their work set a new standard in engineering research and design. Their 
case demonstrates the essential role experimental parameter variation plays in 
engineering research and the limits of theoretical knowledge, in this case the 
                                                          
15 Ibid., pp. 159-166.   
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blade element theory. Within a short period experimental parameter variation 
spread and became an established method that encompassed the early work from 
William Durand in the United States, Robert E. Froude in Britain, and Karl 
Schaffran in Germany.16   
 
4. THE ENGINEERING OF THE FCC AUCTION  
  
The philosopher Francesco Guala characterises the FCC auction as a case of 
economic engineering. He is mainly concerned with the problem of external 
validity. In particular, he is concerned with the kind of inferences which extend 
internally valid propositional knowledge produced in the laboratory into the 
outside world. The problem is philosophically relevant because those true and 
reliable inferences made predicting and explaining behaviour in the laboratory 
are not obviously true and reliable when new markets and state institutions are to 
be built. He argues that the combination of inferences by analogy, eliminative 
inferences and the reproduction of real world conditions in the laboratory explain 
the success of the FCC auction.17   
While the propositional knowledge engineers have is certainly essential, 
the practical knowledge they have for the construction of social machines seems 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p. 294; see also D. W. Taylor (1924).   
17 F. Guala (2005), pp. 184-202.   
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to be more distinctive of engineering. Such a practical knowledge from 
engineering actually starts in the laboratory, where new mechanisms are tested. I 
argue that experimental parameter variation is an example of this practical 
knowledge. Guala himself is aware of the existing gap in the philosophical 
research on this kind of knowledge, which actually explains how while new 
markets and state institutions are built. He acknowledges this in the replies he 
gives to Anna Alexandrova and Frank Hindriks.   
Alexandrova and Hindriks are both critical of the explanation Guala 
provides on the role experiments have in producing knowledge which lies outside 
theories and blueprints. They actually do not use the term ‘blueprints’, they use 
the term ‘models’ instead. Alexandrova is mainly concerned with the limitations 
blueprints have on the behaviour and other relevant conditions to be found in the 
outside world; when a new kind of auction is implemented; she explains that 
when  ‘economic models and experiments are used for engineering institutions 
such as spectrum auctions  […] sometimes it is simply not known whether or not 
some assumption essential for deriving a particular effect in the model can be 
satisfied by the target system economists are constructing.’18 Hindriks makes a 
general criticism to theoretical economists who are sceptical or neglect the 
contributions experimental economists could make creating new knowledge, and 
he criticises Guala for not making wider and stronger case in favour of 
                                                          
18 A. Alexandrova (2008), pp. 199-200.   
262 F. Hindricks (2008), p. 217.   
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experimental economics beyond inference and external validity. He explains that 
‘except for a few scattered remarks, however, Guala does not directly address the 
scepticism that economists display about experiments.’262   
In his reply, Guala highlights the good job experimental economists do 
testing the hypotheses contained in the blueprints, while at the same time 
recognises that ‘the story is very different for experiments that are closer to 
application (‘testbed’ experiments). Here Alexandrova is right –no standards 
account of modelling does a good job at explaining what is going on.’19 In his 
reply to Hindriks he explains that ‘as he correctly points out, MEE [Guala’s book 
Methodology of Experimental Economics] is quite bold in making prescriptive 
claims about experimental inference but relatively modest the role of 
experimentation in economics as a whole.’20   
My argument on experimental parameter variation as a method of 
experimental economics answers the concerns expressed by Alexandrova and 
Hindriks. The use of experimental parameter variation shows the distinctive 
contribution experimental economists make to the design and engineering in 
economics. Moreover, the scope of experimental parameter variation could be 
extended to experiments performed in other social sciences.   
The blueprint submitted by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee represented a 
good solution to important problems such as complementary values, perfect 
                                                          
19 F. Guala (2008), p. 229.   
20 Ibid., p. 227.   
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substitution and preference maximisation on package-bidding. Nonetheless, its 
implementation represented a great challenge, the joint functioning of the three 
main mechanisms looked too complicated.  Mechanism design theorists were no 
able to create a reliable expectation on how it all would work. Besides the right 
functioning, there were also concerns on how to prevent collusion and cheating. 
Unlike the other kinds of auction such as the Dutch and English auctions, 
multiple-round simultaneous auctions had never been tried before.   
Rules constitute a fundamental part of mechanisms, and it the case of the 
FCC auction blueprint ‘the most important – and debated – rules concerned 
increments, withdrawals, eligibility, waivers and activity.’21  The auction would 
not be continuous but split into rounds with no pre-fixed number of total rounds, 
that is, the rounds would continue until no offer is put forward, and the winner is 
satisfied with the licences she has purchased. To ensure a maximal satisfaction 
of preferences, withdrawals were an important part of the rules. It was also 
important to prevent unnecessary delays speeding up the action without 
prematurely terminating demand, so rules on bid increments and an eligibility 
based on a deposit were considered in the blueprint.   
As part of the activity rules the eligibility of bidders was important because 
some of them may want to slow down the bidding process by following a ‘wait 
and see’ strategy. Such a delay could cause significant inefficiencies, and it 
would also increase the costs of the auction. Therefore, the eligibility of any 
                                                          
21 F. Guala (2005), p. 175.   
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bidder would be subject to an initial deposit called ‘initial eligibility’, which 
would also set a limit to the number of markets the bidder could participate in. 
This rule of eligibility also prescribed the regular use of such a deposit by 
spending parts of it in each bid. A refusal to do this would affect the eligibility of 
the bidder by reducing the number of bids she could make in the next round. 
Neither game theory nor auction theory provide information on how long an 
auction with multiple rounds could last, so with the eligibility rule, the auctioneer 
would be able to speed up the auction by enforcing an early commitment from 
all bidders. This rule would also help identify bidders who lacked any real interest 
in acquiring the licences, which was a problem auctions in New Zealand and 
Australia faced where uninterested bidders caused significant delays.  
         Three key data were missing on these rules, which no theory or previous 
knowledge on mechanisms could provide information on, namely:  
 
1) Optimal bid increment.  
2) Estimate of the total number of rounds.  
3) Length cycles produced when licences are sold back  
   
 
Without reliable data on these three aspects, the efficiency and smooth running 
of the auction would be compromise, and its full implementation could actually 
fail. The FCC hired the economist Charles Plott and asked him to perform 
experiments on these and other aspects of the auction. Guala provides a rich 
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description of the experiments performed by Plott, however he does not draw a 
systematic methodological lesson from it. This is also pointed out by 
Alexandrova.22 Charles Plott also provides a detailed description of the 
experiments he and his team in Caltech performed calling them ‘testbeds’, which 
he defines as ‘a simple working prototype of a process that is going to be 
employed in a complex environment. The creation of the prototype and the study 
of its operation provide a joining of theory, observation, and the practical aspects 
of implementation.’23   
The idea of a ‘working prototype’ is insightful and it actually corresponds 
to the term used in engineering, however the definition on the whole is poor and 
uninformative for any scientist who would like to have a clear and simplified 
understanding of the crux of the method. There is no abstraction made from the 
descriptive details, which would enable any scientist to see in a simplified 
manner the nature and systemic side of those practices. This is why I argue that 
by extending the method experimental parameter variation to the design of the 
FCC auction, we draw and extend methodological lessons which otherwise 
would remain lost in the rich description provided. Let us recall that experimental 
parameter variation consists of determining via experimentation the optimal 
performance of materials, processes or devices by varying the parameters of their 
operation.  
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 197.  
23 Ibid., p. 607.   
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         The most comprehensive report of the experimental practices performed in 
preparation for the implementation of the FCC auction is provided by Plott. 
However, parts of the report are insufficient for producing a richer and more 
detailed methodological description. Another problem is the small number of 
experiments he performed. Unlike Durand and Lesley, who carried out 
comprehensive tests of propellers with a great range of variation, Plott and his 
team only conducted a small number of experiments due to the deadline and time 
and budget constraints set by the FCC. He explains that ‘pressures of time and 
money substantially limited the amounts of experimental data that could be 
collected’, therefore ‘the strategy was to select certain key aspects of the 
parameter/theory space and collect such data as one could.’24 Only two 
parameters were subject to variation, namely the total number of licences and the 
number of those with complementary values. In one case, seven licences were 
auctioned with two collections of three licences each having complimentary 
values; in the second case nine licences were auctioned with all of them having 
complimentary values. The experiments had two aims. The first one was to 
compare the efficiency of the multiple-round simultaneous auction allocating 
licences to bidders who value them most against a Japanese auction. The second 
one was to provide information on optimal and estimate values of the activity 
rules from the multiple-round simultaneous auction.  
                                                          
24 Ibid. p. 614.   
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(1) Optimal bid increment. As an auctioneer, the FCC had an interest in 
identifying the winners rapidly, so that the auction could finish as soon as 
possible without negatively affecting the demand. For this purpose, the blueprint 
considered a bid increment every round. The auctioneer would do this by 
identifying the highest standing bid at the end of each round introducing an 
increment for the minimal bid in the next round. On the one hand, an excessive 
increment could deter potential bidders, causing demand-killing and the 
reduction of eligibility. On the other hand, a too small of an increment would not 
speed up the auction enough. Therefore, the discovery of the optimal increment 
became an important problem of design.   
      During the variation of increments performed the laboratory, Plott and his 
team observed that large increments above the highest standing bid effectively 
eliminated bidders too quickly placing at risk the inefficient allocation of 
licences. Without specifying the number and values of the variations, Plott 
explains that ‘experiments had also produced evidence of the capacity of large 
increments to be demand-killing: A bidder failing to bid because of a large 
increment could lose eligibility.’25 The FCC reports that an increment of ten to 
twenty percent above the highest standing bid was found to be the optimal 
                                                          
25 Ibid., p. 633.   
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range.26 This was enough to speed up the auction but not too big to cause 
demand-killing and inefficiency.    
(2) Estimate of the total number of rounds. The second data to be obtained 
was an estimate on the total number of rounds. The FCC was concerned about 
the operation costs if the auction extended for a long time. Plott considered 
different aspects of the behaviour from the bidders and the auctioneer, which 
could compromise the efficiency of the auction. On the one hand, there was the 
strategic interest bidders may have in slowing down the auction. On the other, 
too much pressure on the bidders could also lead to overbidding. A further 
concern emerged from the allowance the blueprint made for the bidders to have 
time off for revising their strategies and budgets; the rule prescribed a stop after 
a number of rounds starting again the next day. This rule also helps prevent the 
winner’s curse saving the FCC from expensive mistakes by preventing a legal 
case in court. Milgrom explained the case noting that ‘sales of major companies 
take a long time. There are billions of dollars at stake here, and there is no reason 
to rush it when we are talking about permanently affecting the structure of a new 
industry.’271 Therefore, getting an estimate of the total number of rounds and 
intervals became crucial data of design with important political, economic and 
legal implications.   
                                                          
26 ‘Smoothing Methodology Fact Sheet, 31th March 2003, FCC Experiments, Papers & Studies, 
electronic source: http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=papers_studies  271 P. 
Milgrom (1994), p.11.   
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Hence, time between rounds would allow bidders to put forward more 
sensible bids, and it would also help prevent overbidding. At the same time, it 
was also important to reduce the number of rounds and intervals as much as 
possible to save on operation costs. In the experiments performed, Plott observed 
that the total time of the auction was mainly dependent on the number of rounds, 
rather on the intervals between them. He explains that ‘many of the early 
experiments that were allowed to terminate naturally involved continuous-time 
processes without stages. Examination of these data suggested that the FCC 
auction could go through as many as a hundred rounds. The more rapid the 
rounds, the sooner would be the termination.’27 This estimate of a hundred rounds 
was good enough because it allowed the FCC to calculate the operation costs and 
consider the need for an adjustment on the activity rules.    
(3)    Length of cycles. The Milgrom-Wilson-McAfee blueprint also 
included a rule allowing withdrawals because the winner decided that the price 
was too high, or because she just changed her preferences.  The rule established 
that licences could be sold back to the market but the bidder returning them would 
have to pay the price difference, if the final price was lower than her own bid. 
Theoretically, it was expected that withdrawals could lead to ‘cycles’ where 
licences returned to auctioneer would have to be sent back to the market more 
than once, until one of the bidders becomes satisfied with the price. Although 
                                                          
27 Plott, 1997, p. 633.   
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this possibility was envisaged, there was no way to calculate how long cycles 
might be.   
Therefore, the production of experimental data on the occurrence and 
length of cycles was another important task which, along with the estimate of the 
total number of rounds, was relevant for estimating the total time of the auction. 
Too many cycles might significantly delay the termination of the auction, or even 
prevent the auction from ending. The experiments showed that a licence package 
may be released up to three times with the last holder losing money. Plott 
reported that ‘since the new price of the item is above the average value of the 
marginal person, the new holder lost money. Panel B shows that releases can 
occur more than once during an auction. As can be seen in that experiment, the 
item was released two times, leading to a cycle of length three.28 Hence, cycles 
were short but overpricing was likely to occur.   
These data on cycles and those on bid increments and the total number of 
rounds were crucial for the final design and implementation of the FCC auction, 
which presumably led to an efficient allocation of telecommunication licences.29 
The revenue from the first round with nine auctions run between 1994 and 1996 
was of twenty-three billion dollars, a large amount that has been hailed as a proof 
of the efficiency of the auction, and the power of game theory for design. 
However, the same credit should be given to experimental economists whose 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 625.   
29 The efficiency of the first round of FCC auctions has been a matter of controversy; see C. Plott (1997), 
p. 637; and P. Cramton (1997).   
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contribution was decisive for the final design and the successful implementation 
of the auction. The success of the FCC auction led governments in Europe to the 
implementation of auctions also for allocation of exploitation rights of the 
electromagnetic spectrum.30   
In philosophy of science, design and engineering methods are often 
neglected by the excessive attention paid to theories and the methods associated 
to them. The use of theories for the design of blueprints has led some to argue 
that the success of the simultaneous ascending auction was due the advancement 
game theory and auction theory. While one can recognise the use of theories in 
both cases the fixed-pitch air propeller and the FCC auction, it would be a mistake 
to attribute the successful design and implementation of them exclusively to 
those  
theories.   
          By reducing the explication of such success to the derivation of knowledge 
fromtheories, theory-testing experiments and externally valid interferences, 
philosophers of science are overlooking the distinctive features of experimental 
and engineering methods. My aim in this chapter has been to show the distinctive 
epistemic and methodological character of these practices and the knowledge 
they produce. Without a set of systematic practices producing data for design, 
                                                          
30 See K. Binmore, and P. Klemperer (2002).   
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engineers and policy-makers would be left only with a set of abstract models and  
predictions on some tendencies.   
Experimental parameter variation is a good example of practical 
knowledge which produces data theories cannot provide. It is also an example 
for philosophers and scientists on how to get a systematic and insightful 
interpretation of some of the practices performed by experimental social 
scientists, which otherwise would remain implicit or lost within long and detailed 
descriptions published in articles and books.  Experimental parameter variation 
has a normative force analogous to any form of argument and inference studied 
in logic using rules such as Modus Ponens, a Celarent syllogism and Bayes’ 
theorem. These rules provide instructions on how to perform inferences, 
experimental parameter variation provides rules on how to perform practices. 
Philosophers of science have excessively focused on inferential rules and 
propositional knowledge from theories and abstract models; by doing this they 
have overlooked and dismissed the role of scientific practices and the knowledge 
they produce.  A comprehensive philosophy of design and engineering in the 
natural and the social sciences is needed. The subjects discussed and the 
arguments put forward in this dissertation are presented as an advance towards 
such a philosophy.              
—O— 
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